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We report a laboratory experiment in the context of the December 2008 riots in Greece, after the killing of a 15-year-old student by a policeman. Our sample 
comprised 266 students from the University of Thessaloniki. We tested whether media reports can affect people’s willingness to harm those in opposing groups 
by examining the way students allocated money between themselves and others of various professions, including police, in modified dictator games. Exposure 
to media reports decreased giving to police, but only when choices were private. Laboratory behaviour was correlated with self-reported participation in de-
monstrations, supporting the external validity of our measure. Media exposure appears to have affected behaviour by different pathways than those proposed 
in the existing literature, including “spiral of silence” and “frame alignment” theories. 
In December 2008, after the killing of fifteen-year-old 
schoolboy Alexandros Grigoropoulos by a member of the 
police force, Greece was shaken by a series of demon-
strations, which swiftly turned violent. Participants fought 
the police and destroyed property. Although mass violence 
has subsided at the time of writing, there have been sub-
sequent terrorist attacks targeting individual on-duty po-
lice officers and mob attacks against police stations.1 The 
December events continue to resonate in current Greek 
politics and society. 
We use Greece as an example to examine the behavioural 
roots of conflict between opposing groups in a democratic 
system. This paper reports an experiment to test the spe-
cific hypothesis that intergroup discrimination and poten-
tially conflict may be fostered by messages from the media. 
Our participants were Greek students, who were asked to 
allocate real money between themselves and others, includ-
ing members of the Greek police force. This complements 
existing research by demonstrating that exposure to media 
may affect behaviour as well as, or instead of, changing 
opinions. To increase confidence in external validity, we 
correlated behaviour in our experiment with self-reported 
participation in demonstrations against the police.
Commentators and academics have blamed the media for 
fomenting civil and political conflict in cases such as the 
civil war in the former Yugoslavia (Oberschall 2001, 2000; 
Kaufman 2001; Ignatieff 1998); twentieth-century race 
riots in the United States (Bauerlein 2001); and the Rwan-
dan genocide (Gourevitch 1999).2 A key observation from 
these case studies is that not all participants in conflict are 
necessarily willing. As one Rwandan eyewitness stated: “ten 
percent helped; 30 percent were forced to kill; 20 percent 
killed reluctantly; 40 percent killed enthusiastically” 
(Mamdani 2001). Indeed, psychologists have hypothesized 
that intergroup violence is aided by the creation of within-
group norms supporting it (Bar-Tal 1990). Similarly, some 
1 See e.g. “Policeman Shot Dead in Greece,” BBC 
News, June 17, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/europe/8104799.stm, “Greek unrest takes 
worrying turn,” BBC News, January 5, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/
7811914.stm.
2 By contrast, the literature on social movements 
has not tended to give the media a leading causal 
role in mobilizing protest (although see Gamson 
1992; Walgrave and Manssens 2000; Cooper 2002).
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observers argue that the media was crucial to the esca-
lation, outcome, and public perception of the December 
2008 events in Greece. Some media outlets presented a very 
emotional account of the boy’s death and its consequences 
for democracy (on the Greek media’s emotional pre-
sentation of events in general, see Patrona 2006, 24); others 
tried to downplay the social importance of the riots, pre-
senting and condemning them as outbreaks of random vi-
olence (Michael-Matsas 2010). For this reason, Greece 
offers an interesting context to examine media effects on 
behaviour towards a specific group in a democratic regime. 
Public opinion research offers theories that could explain 
the role of the media in this process. Framing theory sug-
gests that media can affect the cognitive schema individ-
uals select to understand a situation. Agenda setting theory 
proposes that some issues can be made more salient in 
audiences’ minds simply by covering them more often. 
Priming extends this, arguing that media coverage makes 
audiences more likely to consider particular issues in 
evaluating actors or issues (Scheufele and Tewksbury 
2007). Frame alignment theory, an extension of framing 
within the social movement literature, holds that messages 
from social movements have a greater impact if they fit 
with a person’s existing beliefs (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and 
Benford 1988). Lastly, and of particular relevance for 
understanding how the media can influence the formation 
of social norms, Neumann (1974, 44) argues that a spiral of 
silence could lead people who thought they were in a mi-
nority to conceal their true beliefs. If individuals depended 
heavily on mass media to learn what others think, this 
would give media power to determine the opinions people 
were willing to express, and hence public opinion; import-
antly, it could also affect the actions people were willing to 
take. Applied to the Rwandan case, the argument would be 
that the media created a climate in which attacks on Tutsis 
were publicly believed to be acceptable, or even required, 
behaviour.3
Our research does not aim to identify the psychological 
mechanisms behind media effects. Instead we examine a 
new and interesting dependent variable – that of behaviour 
with monetary consequences. Research on these topics has 
typically focused on measurement of opinions, or in the 
case of the spiral of silence, on measuring willingness to 
speak out, often via hypothetical questions.4 This is a limi-
tation if we are interested in behaviour such as conflict par-
ticipation, because behaviour and expressed opinions may 
vary independently of one another. On the other hand, 
case studies of civil conflict (and other forms of research 
such as survey analysis and media content analysis) can 
focus on behavioural dependent variables, but it is in-
trinsically hard for them to demonstrate causality. We 
therefore chose a middle way: a laboratory experiment in 
which the dependent variable is behavioural. We cannot di-
rectly study participation in violent conflict in the labor-
atory, but we can explore behaviour that has real monetary 
consequences, both for the participants and for others. 
While such behaviour certainly offers no guarantee of ex-
ternal validity,5 it does provide evidence that goes beyond 
the informational content of opinion questions and hypo-
thetical questions about behaviour. Specifically, we exam-
ine (1) the effect of media on behaviour and (2) the 
interaction between media exposure and the publicity of 
subjects’ decisions. This allows us to examine the “spiral of 
silence” effect, which predicts that individuals will be more 
affected by media when they know their actions will be vis-
ible to others who have been exposed to the same media. 
In our experiment, participants first read a newspaper ar-
ticle: a treatment group read an inflammatory article deal-
ing with the shooting of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, while a 
control group read a neutral article. They then allocated 
real money between (1) themselves, and (2) anonymous re-
cipients identified only by profession, including members 
of the Thessaloniki police force. Our dependent variable is 
“giving discrimination”: the difference between amounts 
given to members of the police force and amounts given to 
3 Fuller literature reviews on priming, framing, 
and agenda-setting can be found in Weaver (2007), 
Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), and Ball-Rokeach 
and DeFleur (1976).
4 For a review, see Scheufele and Moy (2000). 
Glynn et al. (1997) provide a meta-analysis of these 
studies and find limited effects. 
5 Similar external validity issues are faced by 
studies on the effects of violent media that use lab 
measures of violent behaviour as a dependent vari-
able. See Geen and Thomas (1986) for a review and 
discussion.
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other groups. We can thus measure whether exposure to 
media affects giving discrimination. A cross-cutting treat-
ment manipulates the publicity of allocation decisions: 
some subjects’ decisions were fully private, while others 
were revealed to a neighbouring participant. This allows us 
to examine how the effect of the media article is moderated 
when subjects’ decisions are made public to others. Thus, 
we can examine the effect of the spiral of silence on behav-
iour. Spiral of silence theory predicts that exposure to mass 
media will change individuals’ views of what the majority 
thinks, and this will change their willingness to express 
their own opinion, or to take actions that reveal their 
opinion in public. This effect will be absent when the same 
actions are private. 
Our participants were students at the University of Thessa-
loniki. Since Thessaloniki was a centre of anti-police ac-
tivity, and since students were centrally involved, our sample 
comes from an interesting population of potential conflict 
participants.6 Indeed, many subjects reported taking part in 
demonstrations against the police. Before making their 
 allocations, half our students were exposed to a (real) news-
paper article discussing the killing of Alexandros Grigo ro -
poulos. The other half were exposed to a neutral article. 
This allows us to measure the effects of media exposure on 
the allocations made. Clearly, donating or withholding 
money in a laboratory is not the same as taking part in a 
potentially violent protest. However, it is an action with real 
consequences for both oneself and others, and this may be 
linked to willingness to take similar action in other contexts. 
In fact, we find a significant correlation between behaviour 
in the laboratory with self-reported protest participation 
during December 2008, detailed in subsection 4.3 below. 
We find that media reports did indeed affect students’ will-
ingness to give to police, but only when decisions were pri-
vate. When decisions were going to be made visible to 
another person, the media report had no effect. Thus, our 
hypothesis that public actions would be more influenced by 
the media was not supported. Also, while media reports de-
creased giving to police when giving was costly, they did not 
decrease giving when not giving was costly – that is, when 
participants had to pay to reduce the recipient’s payoff. 
Thus, although exposure to media can change people’s be-
haviour, we did not find evidence that the media can cause 
people to take action with material costs to themselves. 
Lastly, media exposure did not significantly affect people’s 
expressed opinions. In other words, our subjects behaved 
differently even though their publicly expressed opinions 
did not change. Our results thus suggest that the link be-
tween opinion and action is complex. Media narratives may 
change what people do in private, for instance by legitimat-
ing selfish behaviour, without affecting the opinions they 
express in public. And making decisions public can (some-
times) dampen the effect of media narratives.
In the next section, we describe the background of our ex-
periment: the Greek riots of 2008, and the role of police, 
students and media in them and in Greek society more 
gener al ly. Section 2 sets out our design and Section 3 gives 
our results.
1. Background: The 2008 Riots
The December 2008 riots in Greece were the public re-
sponse to the killing of a fifteen-year-old Athenian school-
boy by a policeman (USA Today 2008). The event catalysed 
an explosion of public discontent which was not directly 
connected to the boy’s death but was indicative of the gen-
eral mood of the society (Christofer 2008). The outrage of 
a traditionally highly politicised society (Alivizatos 1990) 
escalated into a month-long conflict between police and 
demonstrators, including both peaceful demonstrations 
and violent riots. Aggression against the police and other 
symbols of state and media power, such as university teach-
ers and journalists, continued in subsequent months, along 
with repeated strikes against government economic po-
licies (Smith 2008).
The violence demonstrates the anger of Greeks, particularly 
young people, towards government and state institutions 
6 However, as is common in experimental work, 
our recruitment methods do not allow us to claim 
that our sample is representative.
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(Karamichas 2009, 291). General dissatisfaction with public 
administration, political corruption, and unsuccessful gov-
ernance has for many years lacked an effective means of ex-
pression, due to Greece’s weak civil society (Mouzelis 1978, 
19). The major political parties dominate social relations 
and expression of opinion in the Greek political sphere 
(Pridham 1990, 116) and have long used corruption and 
clientelism to secure their rule (Pappas 1999, 169–220). 
The on-going economic crisis added to public dissatisfac-
tion with the dysfunctionalities and corruption of the 
Greek political system. The riots have been described as the 
first political explosion of the current world economic cri-
sis, combining features from May 1968, and from the 
French banlieu rebellion in 2005 (Michael-Matsas 2010).
During the events of December 2008, the police were the 
main target of protesters’ anger, not only because of their 
function as a law and order mechanism. Historically the 
Greek police have been seen as an organ of state repression. 
Before 1974, the police were used by both the dictatorship 
and elected right-wing governments to keep the masses out 
of politics (Veremis 1997; Demertzis and Kafetzis 1996). 
Support for democracy was suppressed and private life was 
infiltrated by a vast network of police informers (Samatas 
1986, 35). The democratization of the state apparatus by the 
Karamanlis administration shied away from introducing 
major reforms out of fear of a backlash (Clogg 2002, 173). 
This led to the disillusionment of ordinary Greek citizens 
with the police (Kassimeris 2001, 262), which continued 
during the Third Greek Republic. In modern Greek politics 
the police are framed as both symptom and cause of political 
failure (Featherstone 2009, 2). The population’s deep lack of 
trust in the police force (Mouzelis 1978, 133), is reinforced 
by the police’s inability to provide good services, and the fact 
that the force is seen as protecting the political establish-
ment, the two major parties. The death of Alexandros Grigo-
ropoulos thus added to a disillusionment not only with the 
police, but with the entire state apparatus, including the 
political, economic, and social elite of the country. An 
opinion poll reporting trust in institutions showed that 
more Greeks distrust the police (46 percent) than trust them 
(43 percent). But the police are not the least trusted in-
stitution. Political parties come bottom, trusted by only 8 
percent, while newspapers are trusted by just 33 percent.7
The role of the media in the December events was crucial. 
Greek media have a special position in the country’s political 
life, participating as an independent political actor, more so 
than in other European democracies. As in other young 
southern European and Latin American democracies, the 
media in Greece are highly party-politicized (Hallin and Pa-
pathanassopoulos 2002). Media companies have invested 
little in developing quality journalism, which is hardly con-
sidered an autonomous profession. Compensating for their 
lack of professionalism, the media chose sensationalism over 
objective presentation of news. Outlets with different 
 political alliances spin the news from different political per-
spectives. As a result, one could read wildly different inter -
pretations of the December riots depending on the source.
The media’s emotional presentation of the boy’s killing 
and their analysis of its impact on democracy (or, on the 
other side, one-sided condemnation of the rioters’ violence 
without comparable condemnations of police actions) may 
have affected opinions – whether privately held or openly 
expressed – about the actors and events of December 2008. 
Equally importantly, it may have affected the behaviour of 
those involved. For that reason we focus our analysis on the 
impact of the media coverage of the events. 
Students are traditionally seen as a force of political change 
by both the students themselves and by Greek society in gen-
eral. The strained relations between students and police and 
the students’ role as the major protest group in the December 
riots give us a valuable opportunity to examine a strong form 
of outgroup discrimination – something that is extremely 
hard to create with minimal groups in the lab (Mummendey 
et al. 1992; Brewer 1999).8 Finally, the political situation 
allows us to examine media effects in a naturalistic way using 
a real media report drawn from the December 2008 period.
7 Opinion poll conducted by Public Issue on De-
cember 17–19, 2008. Results can be found at 
http://www.publicissue.gr/1028/institutions-2/. 
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2. Experimental Design and Questionnaire
Experiments were conducted in nine sessions from April 8 
to April 11, 2009, at the University of Macedonia, Thessalo-
niki, Greece. The sessions were held in the computer labor-
atory of the Economics Faculty, with adaptations for 
running computerized experiments.9 Subjects were re-
cruited via two methods: a) voluntary registration during 
lectures at the European and International Studies depart-
ment and b) posters and leaflets distributed in and around 
the university and in the city centre.10 The subjects were 
aware that they would be paid €2.50 for participating, and 
would have the potential to earn more depending on their 
answers. Volunteers contacted us by phone, e-mail, or in 
person to subscribe to the session of their choice and were 
informed that the sessions would run for an hour.
We employed a 2 × 2 factorial design, where we varied the 
publicity of the decisions and subjects’ exposure to media. 
We applied these four treatments between subjects, so that 
any subject was exposed to only one of the four treatments. 
The experiment had two stages. In the first stage subjects 
read one of two newspaper articles: one dealing with the 
riots, and a control article about the activities of a Greek in-
ternet telephony company. In the second stage, subjects 
played a series of dictator games in which their decisions 
were either public or private. (Whether the subjects were in 
the private or the public treatment was determined before-
hand and did not change during the experiment. This was 
communicated to the subjects before they made any deci-
sions.) In each dictator game subjects could give money to 
people outside the lab, identified by their profession and 
gender. In these games we varied the recipient (the other) 
and the relative price of giving to the other. After all al-
location decisions had been taken, subjects were asked to fill 
out an electronic questionnaire. Table 1 gives an overview of 
the experimental design.11 All sessions were conducted by the 
same experimenters, taking the same roles in each session.
Table 1: Structure of the experiment
8 Other researchers have used ethnic groups to exam-
ine intergroup behaviour. Here is the problem that norms 
of inter-ethnic fairness, which are common in societies 
where ethnic groups must live together, may interfere 
with research. Indeed, experimental work with “home-
grown” groups often finds weaker results than that with 
minimal groups (Habyarimana et al. 2007; Whitt and 
Wilson 2007; Goerg et al. 2008; Bernhard et al. 2006).
9 Photographs available on request.
10 As with most laboratory experiments, our recruit-
ment methods are unlikely to give a truly random 
sample of the population of interest. However, there are 
no obvious reasons for our results to be biased in any 
specific direction. Since April 11 was a Saturday, the stu-
dents on campus that day might be a strongly selected 
subset. We have too few observations on the Saturday 
(38 in total in four treatments) to explicitly test for se-
lection effects, but our results are robust to the exclu-
sion of the Saturday session (analyses available upon re-
quest).
11 The protocol and written instructions are available 
on request.
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
Neutral media/
private
(N=68)
Introduction and explanation of experiment
Neutral media
Example for choice on the budget sets
Profession chosen at random without replacement out of six pro-
fessions (stratified within subject)
Choice on linear budget set chosen randomly without replacement 
out of nine different possibilities
Stratified within subject and profession
Price of giving (in €)
0.50
1.00
2.00
0.00
2.00
–0.50
–1.00
–2.00
Choice on step-shaped budget set
Post-experimental questionnaire
Riot media/
private
(N=72)
Riot media
Neutral media/
public
(N=72)
Neutral media
Budget (in €)
7.50
7.50
7.50
7.50
15.00
5.00
7.50
10.00
Discuss decisions with neighbour 
Riot media/ 
public
(N=54)
Riot media
The columns represent between subject treatments and the rows within subject decisions. Num-
ber of observations reported for between-subjects treatments.
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2.1. Media Articles
We asked subjects to read an article from a Greek newspaper 
and find spelling mistakes.12 Subjects were given five mi-
nutes to complete the task. Half of the subjects read a neu-
tral article about business activities of a large internet 
telephony company. The other half were presented with a 
news article containing a detailed description of the shoot-
ing of the fifteen-year old boy, broadly sympathetic to de-
monstrators and critical of the police. This article functions 
as a riot media treatment presenting the subjects with a 
subtle negative stimulus towards the police triggering a 
more emotional reaction. Subjects were asked to count the 
spelling mistakes and rewarded with 1€ for getting the cor-
rect number (which was 10). This task resembles a priming 
task, frequently used in psychological research to make a 
certain concept more salient (Bargh and Chartrand 2000; 
see Tajfel 1981 or Benjamin et al. forthcoming for ap-
plications to economics). We do not attempt to distinguish 
between the different causal mechanisms which may have 
been operating, including “priming,” “framing,” and “agen-
da-setting” effects. The relationship between these concepts 
is complex and controversial (Scheufele and Tewksbury 
2007) and its discussion is not the focus of this research. 
Subjects were aware that both articles came from Kathimer-
ini, a widely read Greek newspaper.13 We chose articles from 
Kathimerini because it has the reputation of being a serious, 
mainstream paper. Its moderately right-wing position is 
well known to the Greek public. More left-wing subjects 
might if anything be sceptical of Kathimerini’s position, 
which would bias our results towards finding no effect of 
the media on behaviour. Another factor that might bias our 
results downward is the “hostile media phenomenon”: sub-
jects tend to perceive media as biased against their own 
views, whatever those views are (Vallone et al. 1985).
2.2. Recipients
Recipients were either police or members of one of five 
other professions: firefighter, private-sector employee, civil 
servant, housewife, or entrepreneur. We used multiple 
groups so as to avoid inducing experimenter demand ef-
fects by making the police/other distinction obvious. Fire-
fighters in particular provide a close comparison group 
with police, since both are uniformed state employees with 
a strong group identity. This allowed us to check whether 
our results come from general intergroup hostility, rather 
than specifically from discrimination against members of 
the police group. Recipients were identified on the com-
puter screen by true profession, along with fictitious names 
that preserved gender, and subjects were informed of this. 
Recipients were not present in the laboratory. Instead, 
money donated was sent to them by post, directly after the 
experiment (see section 3.3. below).
2.3. Dictator Game
In a dictator game subjects are asked to split money be-
tween themselves and a recipient. Dictator games are 
widely used in experimental economics to measure other-
regarding preferences (e.g. Forsythe et al. 1994); behaviour 
in dictator games may also be affected by norms (Dana et 
al. 2006). Each subject played six turns of a modified dic-
tator game – one for each profession. In each turn a pro-
fession was chosen randomly without replacement, a 
recipient was chosen randomly from a pool of potential re-
cipients of the chosen profession, and the subject then 
made nine decisions allocating money between him- or 
herself and the recipient. So every subject was presented 
with all of the six professions in random order.
Motivated by analogous situations in civil conflict, we 
wished to learn how subjects behaved when discrimination 
carried a cost to the discriminator, and more generally how 
discrimination was affected by changes in its cost. There-
fore, we varied the price of giving to the other person ac-
ross the nine decisions.14 Subjects were shown a series of 
different budget sets, with payoff to oneself on the y-axis 
and payoff to the recipient on the x-axis, and were asked to 
pick a point on the boundary of the budget set, as shown in 
Figure 1. Before the actual task, subjects made a non-paid 
trial choice to ensure that the setup was well understood. 
12 A translation of the articles (without spelling 
mistakes) can be found in the Appendix.
13 According to the newspaper To Vima, November 
25, 2008, http://www.tovima.gr/default.asp? 
pid=2&artid=243941&ct=85&dt=12/10/2008.
14 For a similar approach see Andreoni and Miller 
(2002) or Fisman et al. (2007).
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When a point was chosen, the resulting allocation was 
shown in figures in the top right corner of the screen. If the 
subject was satisfied with the decision, they confirmed the 
choice. There were three different kinds of budgets. Four 
were standard budget sets crossing the x-axis at 7.5€ or 
15€, and the y-axis at 7.5€ or 15€. Thus, the price to give to 
the other person was either 0.5€, 1€, or 2€ and the own en-
dowment was either 7.5€ or 15€. One budget set had a zero 
price of giving: the set crossed the y-axis at 7.5€, continued 
to (7.5€,7.5€) and then dropped to cross the x-axis at 7.5€. 
Figure 1: Examples of budget sets
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
You get Remaining time [sec]
The other one gets
10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
You get Name: Aristotelis Papadopoulos
Profession: Firefighter
Your decision will be shown to your neighbour
The other one gets 5.4 €
You get 10.8 €
Total 16.2 €
The other one gets
Note: Amount given to self is on the Y axis and amount given to the other is on the X axis. Subjects clicked on the budget line to determine the allocation. After each click they were shown the allocation, which they could then confirm. 
10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
You get Remaining time [sec]
The other one gets 10.0 €
You get 3.7 €
Total 13.7 €
The other one gets
Competitive
Selfish
Lexself
Inequality averse
Egalitarian
Other damaging
Self damaging
Figure 2: Step-shaped budget set
Note: Diagram labels and emphasized points were not shown on the screen. 
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We call these five budgets, including the zero price budget, the 
“costly giving” budgets. Three budget sets had a negative price 
of giving, i.e. it was actually costly not to give to the other – we 
describe these as “costly withholding” budgets. These started at 
the origin, and went to either (5,10), (7.5,7.5) or 10,5), so that 
the price of not giving was 0.5€, 1€, or 2€. This is the closest 
laboratory analogue to behaviour that has costs to the actor as 
well as to the potential victims, such as participation in riots. 
The final budget set in each profession was step-shaped 
(see Figure 2). The step-shaped budget set is suitable for 
detecting certain prototypical forms of other-regarding 
preferences in a non-parametric way, as choices within cer-
tain subsets on the budget line have a direct interpretation 
in terms of social preferences. 
Competitive subjects want to maximize the difference be-
tween their income and the income of the recipient. Selfish 
subjects choose the highest possible outcome for themselves 
but, given this choice, do not maximize the payoff of the 
other. Lexself subjects maximize their payoff and then the 
payoff of the other. Inequality averse subjects will forego their 
own profit in order to reduce inequality. The egalitarian point 
indicates strong preferences for fairness. Points to the right of 
this point indicate other-damaging behaviour on the hor-
izontal line, and self-damaging behaviour on the vertical line.
2.4. Private and Public Treatments
In the public treatment, after the dictator games, one set of 
each subject’s decisions was chosen at random and dis-
played to a single other subject, who was seated at a neigh-
bouring workstation in the lab; pairs of neighbours were 
then asked to chat (using the zTree interface) about their 
decisions for three minutes. In the private treatment, deci-
sions were not displayed and there was no chat. 
In neither case could we, the experimenters, connect sub-
jects’ decisions to their real identities. In both cases, sub-
jects were informed of this in advance. Half the subjects 
were in the public treatment, half in the private. 
2.5. Questionnaire and Payment
Immediately after the experiment, but before the payment 
procedure, subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire on-
screen. They were assured that their answers were anony -
mous, and that they were not obliged to answer any 
questions. The questionnaire included the following sections. 
1. Open-ended questions on the purpose of the experi-
ment, so as to check for experimenter demand effects 
(see below). 
2. Trust in institutions, including the media and the police. 
3. Questions about the riots, including multiple choice 
questions on who was to blame for the riots, the causes of 
the riots, whether violence by the police and/or students 
was justified, and whether policing had been effective. 
4. Questions on the subject’s own participation in and ex-
perience of demonstrations, including participation in 
violence. 
5. Questions measuring the subject’s level of identification 
with the student group. 
6. Demographics. 
After all subjects had completed the questionnaire, they 
were called up individually and paid privately before leav-
ing the laboratory. Subjects were shown the money they 
had allocated to dictator game recipients being placed in 
envelopes for posting (but not shown the recipients’ names 
or addresses), and one volunteer subject came with us to 
observe the envelopes being posted.
2.6. Credibility and Debriefing
Greece is a low-trust society, so we were concerned to es-
tablish the credibility of our experiment. Initial in-
structions for participants, which were read out in public, 
stressed that economic experiments do not use deception. 
In the post-experimental questionnaire, we asked subjects 
whether they trusted the experimenters to send the money 
on a scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”). The 
mean responses by treatment were: riot/private 6.02; riot/
public 6.06; neutral/private 5.70; and neutral/public 5.60. 
The responses are quite high, and are not significantly dif-
ferent at a 10 percent level using rank-sum tests. Thus, even 
if credibility was not achieved for all participants, this will 
not have affected the treatments differently.
Another concern in psychological experiments is “experi-
menter demand” effects, which cause participants to be-
have in ways they think the experimenters want. This 
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makes it important that participants do not guess the pur-
pose of the experiment.15 Priming tasks can be a particular 
area of concern (Bargh and Chartrand 2000). By including 
multiple social groups as recipients, using a non-standard 
dictator game, and by framing the media article as a spell-
ing task, we aimed to avoid this. As a check, our ques-
tionnaire included open questions on the experiment 
topic. No participant mentioned the police or the De-
cember 2008 disturbances.
2.7. Hypotheses
We use a simple measure for our dependent variable: the 
difference between amount given to members of the police 
force and amount given to other groups. We call this “giv-
ing discrimination”.16 To examine whether media can af-
fect behaviour towards the police group, we formulate the 
following key hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Giving discrimination will be greater in the 
riot media treatment.
We split this into two sub-hypotheses, based on the dif-
ferent costs of giving.
Hypothesis 1.1 Giving discrimination will be greater in the 
riot media treatment, in the costly giving budgets.
Hypothesis 1.2 Giving discrimination will be greater in the 
riot media treatment, in the costly withholding budgets.
To examine the spiral of silence hypothesis, we test for an 
interaction effect between the publicity and media treat-
ments. If exposure to media affects how our subjects per-
ceive others’ opinion, and they care about others’ 
opinion when their actions can be observed in public, 
then:
Hypothesis 2 The increase in giving discrimination from 
neutral to riot media treatment will be greater in the public 
treatment.
We also wish to examine whether exposure to media affects 
people’s expressed opinions. Our questionnaire included 
multiple choice questions asking which groups the subject 
blamed for the December disturbances.
Hypothesis 3 Blame for the police will be greater in the riot 
media treatment.
Lastly, we use the same measure to test whether behaviour 
is correlated with expressed political beliefs, and to test the 
prediction of frame alignment theory that messages are 
more effective if they fit with a person’s existing beliefs. 
Thus we expect an interaction between the media treat-
ment and our measure of beliefs.
Hypothesis 4 Giving discrimination will be greater among 
subjects who blame the police for the shooting.
Hypothesis 5 The increase in giving discrimination from 
neutral to riot media treatment will be greater among sub-
jects who blame the police for the shooting.
3. Results
In total 184 subjects participated; the number of subjects 
per session varied between 12 and 28. 58.6 percent of the 
subjects were female. 20.2 percent of the women and 30.9 
percent of the men stated that they participated in demon-
strations connected to the events in December, but nobody 
admitted taking violent action. The experiment lasted 
around one hour. The average payment (including show-
up fee and rewards for correct counts in the initial task) 
was about 10 euros. 
Table 2 gives a detailed overview of the allocations to the 
different professions by treatment over all budget sets. 
The first – and not necessarily surprising – observation is 
that average giving over all treatments when the decision 
is observed increases giving to the other by around 0.50 
(t-test, p-value < 0.001). This fits with research on ob-
servability in experimental games, which is known to in-
15 Participants were invited to email the re-
searchers if they wished to learn more about the ex-
periment after taking part.
16 This term is purely for convenience, and is not 
meant to imply any particular theory for the reasons 
behind the difference between amounts given.
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crease the pressure to conform with norms such as 
fairness and generosity (e.g. Andreoni and Petrie 2004, 
Dana et al. 2006). In contrast, there is no significant dif-
ference between the riot and the neutral prime over all 
profession types.
prime treatment, which we examine more closely when 
testing our hypothesis in the next section. 
4.1. Non-parametric Tests
We measure an individual’s “giving discrimination” as 
average giving to non-police, minus average giving to po-
lice. (Results do not change if more complex measures are 
used, such as the t-statistic of a police dummy in a regres-
sion of an individual’s giving.) Table 3 shows average giv-
ing discrimination by treatment.
Profession
– Police
[All non-police]
– Civil servant
– Private-sector 
employee
– Housewife
– Entrepreneur
– Firefighter
Total
Treatment
Private
Neutral
4.16 (0.17)
4.41 (0.07)
4.27 (0.16)
4.41 (0.16)
4.86 (0.16)
3.90 (0.17)
4.62 (0.16)
4.37
Riot
4.01 (0.16)
4.66 (0.07)
4.26 (0.15)
4.62 (0.15)
5.07 (0.15)
4.25 (0.15)
5.12 (0.15)
4.56
Public
Neutral
5.08 (0.15)
5.00 (0.07)
4.63 (0.15)
5.06 (0.15)
5.48 (0.15)
4.47 (0.16)
5.37 (0.15)
5.01
Riot
4.92 (0.17)
4.90 (0.08)
4.87 (0.17)
4.81 (0.17)
5.34 (0.16)
4.24 (0.17)
5.24 (0.16)
4.90
Total
4.53
4.74
4.49
4.73
5.18
4.22
5.09
Table 2: Average giving over all budget sets (pooled) by treatment (euros)
In the private treatment, when subjects received the neu-
tral prime, police and entrepreneurs received the lowest 
average contributions. In the riot prime, the donation to 
policemen was lower, at 4.01, while the contributions to 
the other professions were greater (or nearly the same in 
the case of civil servant). This is in accordance with our 
expectations that giving discrimination will be greater in 
the riot media treatment. A particularly striking observ-
ation is the rise in payments to police from the private 
treatment to the public treatment under the neutral media 
condition. They received over 0.90 more and their average 
payment actually exceeded the average of the other groups. 
This shows that subjects were functioning according to the 
norm of giving and non-discrimination in public, but 
showed their true feelings in private. This corresponds to 
the spiral of silence theory. In the public treatment, the 
riot prime decreased contributions for all profession types. 
The difference between police and fire service personnel 
we do not investigate further. We furthermore find sig-
nificant differences for decisions made in the private, riot 
Neutral
Riot
Total
Neutral
Riot
Total
Neutral
Riot
Total
All budget sets
Private
N
45
48
93
Positive Prices
Private
N
45
48
93
Negative Prices
Private
N
45
48
93
0.258
0.658***
0.466***
0.146
0.692***
0.431**
0.166
0.327
0.247
Public
N
48
38
86
Public
N
48
38
86
Public
N
48
38
86
−0.079
−0.021
−0.053
−0.28
−0.092
−0.115
0.237
−0.369
−0.116
Total
N
93
86
179
Total
N
93
86
179
Total
N
93
86
179
0.086
0.358***
0.217***
−0.073
0.427**
0.169
0.126
0.019
0.073
Table 3: Discrimination by media and publicity treatments
Standard error of means in parentheses 
Note: Significance levels of Mann-Whitney test whether discrimination is present: * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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to the subject. Table 4 gives further support for this result 
for the step-shaped budget set. We categorized subjects’ 
choices on the step-shaped set by their corresponding 
prototypical social preferences, as described above. The dis-
tributions of social preference types for police and non-
police recipients are significantly different in the private, 
riot media treatment (χ²-test, p-value: 0.01). In particular, 
subjects are much more likely to show competitive prefer-
ences towards police than to non-police. In the other three 
treatment combinations we do not observe this difference.
To examine Hypothesis 3 that blame for the police will be 
greater in the riot media treatment, we examined a ques-
tion from the questionnaire: “Who was to blame for the 
December 2008 riots?” Subjects were presented with dif-
ferent alternatives, of which more than one could be 
chosen. We count those subjects who chose either “the po-
lice” or “the police leadership” as blaming the police. In a 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, blaming the police was not sig-
nificantly different between riot media and neutral media 
treatments (p-value: 0.23, one-tailed). Thus, Hypothesis 3 
is rejected. By surveying opinions alone, we would con-
clude that the media have little short-run effect.
Turning to Hypothesis 4 (giving discrimination will be 
greater among subjects who blame the police for the shoot-
ing), we compare subjects who blamed the police or police 
leadership for the riots with those who did not. Giving dis-
crimination is not greater among those who blamed the 
police – in fact it is less, but insignificantly so (0.153 vs. 
0.260, p=0.921, one-tailed). The same holds for cheap dis-
crimination. However, this pattern is reversed in the private 
treatment: discrimination is higher among those who 
blame the police, and for cheap discrimination this is sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level (p=0.0576, one-tailed).
To examine Hypothesis 5 (the increase in giving dis-
crimination from neutral to riot media treatment will be 
greater among subjects who blame the police for the shoot-
ing), we look whether there is a significant trend towards 
Preference  
type
Competitive
Egoistic
Lexicographic  
self
Egalitarian
Equity
Other- 
damaging
Self- 
damaging
Pearson’s  
test
Private
Neutral 
Police
% of subjects in category
13.33
26.67
35.56
4.44
11.11
6.67
2.22
5.45 (0.49)
Not 
 police
10.67
18.22
47.56
9.33
5.78
6.22
2.22
Riot 
 Police
25.00
18.75
29.17
2.08
20.83
4.17
0
17.17** (0.01)
Not 
 police
8.57
12.24
41.22
6.12
17.55
12.65
1.63
Public
Neutral 
Police
4.17
14.58
45.83
10.42
18.75
6.25
0
4.57 (0.47)
Not 
 police
3.72
13.22
58.26
5.37
11.57
10.42
0
Riot 
 Police
13.16
13.16
34.21
10.53
15.79
13.16
0
1.61 (0.95)
Not 
 police
11.40
11.92
33.16
8.29
21.24
11.92
2.07
We then ran Mann-Whitney tests on discrimination in the 
different treatments.17 There was a slight, but not sig-
nificant, increase in discrimination in the riot treatment 
over the neutral treatment (p=0.127, one-tailed). Thus, Hy-
pothesis 1 (giving discrimination will be greater in the riot 
media treatment) receives weak support in the data. Next, 
we differentiate between costly giving and costly withhold-
ing budgets.
Table 4: Preference types elicited from choices on the step-shaped set
Note: Significance levels of Pearson’s chi-squared test of equality of distributions between choi-
ces for the police and non-police groups on the step-shaped budget set by treatment (p-value in 
parentheses): * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Discrimination did not vary significantly between media 
treatments when withholding was costly (p=0.846, one-
tailed). Cheap discrimination, however, is significantly 
stronger in the riot media treatment (p=0.009, one-tailed). 
Thus, Hypothesis 1.1 about the costly giving budgets is sup-
ported, but Hypothesis 1.2 about the costly withholding 
budgets is not: the riot cue increased the difference between 
giving to police and others, but only when giving was costly 
17 The use of non-parametric tests is robust to 
non-normality of the data. However, they might 
have less statistical power than parametric tests like 
the t-test, when the normality assumption is not vi-
olated.
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discrimination when changing from the neutral to the riot 
treatment. We find that cheap discrimination is sig-
nificantly stronger (difference: 0.59, Kruskal-Wallis test, 
p-value: 0.06) when subjects blame the police and their 
decision is private. We also find an increase in dis-
crimination in the public treatment, but this is not sig-
nificant at conventional levels (difference: 0.33, 
Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value: 0.15). We do not find sig-
nificant differences in discrimination between the riot and 
the neutral treatments behaviour with subjects who – ac-
cording to the questionnaire – did not blame the police.
4.2. Regression Tests
The overall pattern revealed so far is that subjects only give 
less to police when it is not costly, and only in private. To 
investigate this further, we ran OLS regressions on giving to 
others, using clustered robust standard errors for inference, 
where the cluster is the individual. Table 5 reports the re-
sults. Riot and Public are dummies for the riot media and 
public treatments respectively.18 
The regression analysis shows the effect of prices and en-
dowments. While for positive prices (these are the costly 
giving treatments) these effects go in expected directions, 
i.e. higher prices reduce giving to the other and higher en-
dowment increases it, the effect of endowment on giving 
goes in an unexpected direction: the higher the endow-
ment (measured in terms of the maximum that a subject 
could give to him- or herself), the lower the willingness to 
contribute, even controlling for the price. This also drives 
the aggregate results in column (1) of Table 5. 
The effects of both media (identified in Table 5 as Riot, in-
dicating that the subjects read the article on the riots) and 
publicity (identified as Public) treatments on giving to 
non-police do not reach significance, except for the public 
treatment effect when prices are zero. For the publicity 
treatment this is surprising, as these findings are not in line 
with previous research on social distance and other-regard-
ing behaviour (for early evidence in simple dictator games 
see Hoffman et al. 1996). The fact that recipients are not 
present in the laboratory may have dampened the effect of 
publicity.19
18 We conducted robustness checks adding the 
gender of the recipient into the regression. The main 
effect of the gender coefficient is insignificant and 
the coefficients of interest did not change in size and 
significance. Results are available upon request.
19 Findings that donations to a third party outside 
the lab are higher when identity is reported to a sub-
ject the lab have been found – to the best of our 
knowledge – only in research on charitable giving. 
See for example Reinstein and Riener (forthcoming) 
in the context of charities. 
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Table 5: Regressions of amount given
Examining the Police dummies – and their interaction with 
the treatments – confirms the results of the non-para-
metric tests. We see no evidence that subjects gave less to 
police in the public treatment: the combined coefficient of 
police plus police × public is not significantly different 
from zero. On the other hand, the combined coefficient of 
police plus police × riot is significantly different from zero 
and negative. Thus, Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected for 
private decisions. However, publicity appears to eliminate 
the effect of the riot media, since the combined coefficient 
police + riot × police + police × public + riot × police × 
public is not significantly different from 0. 
We now turn to Hypothesis 4. Table 6 shows a simple re-
gression of giving discrimination on treatment dummies, 
crossed with a dummy for those who blamed police or po-
lice leadership. If the riot cue had more effect on this 
Price
Endowment
Riot
Public
Police
Riot × public
Police × public
Police × riot
Police × riot × public
Downward
Constant
Combined coefficients
Police + police × riot
Police + police × public
Police + police × public
+ police × riot + police × public × riot
Observations
R2
(1)
Non-zero prices
0.802*** (0.0781)
-0.0755*** (0.0138)
0.201 (0.254)
0.517 (0.275)
-0.154 (0.199)
-0.188 (0.362)
0.278 (0.235)
-0.381 (0.297)
0.363 (0.355)
-4.627*** (0.336)
7.527*** (0.319)
-0.536** (0.221)
0.124 (0 .125)
0.105 (0.149)
7607
0.2278
(2)
Positive prices
-2.333*** (0.155)
0.270*** (0.0156)
0.502 (0.460)
0.640 (0.448)
-0.146 (0.242)
-0.159 (0.633)
0.427 (0.314)
-0.547 (0.340)
0.173 (0.449)
2.339*** (0.376)
-0.692*** (0.241)
0.281 (0.200)
-0.092 (0.214)
4348
0.0989
(3)
Negative prices
2.181*** (0.069)
-0.080*** (0.028)
-0.199 (0.309)
0.350 (0.288)
-0.166 (0.202)
-0.225 (0.436)
0.0818 (0.257)
-0.161 (0.326)
0.614 (0.409)
9.511*** (0.394)
-0.327 (0.256)
-0.083 (0.158)
0.369 (0.190)
3259
0.3178
(4)
Zero price
0.471 (0.428)
1.158** (0.404)
-0.711 (0.393)
-1.159* (0.583)
0.668 (0.512)
-0.220 (0.575)
-0.206 (0.769)
5.353*** (0.348)
-0.931 **(0.420)
-0.042 (0.328)
-0.468 (0.391)
1087
0.0365
Dependent variable is amount in euros. Coefficients are unstandardized. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. 
Column (1) pools costly withholding (negative prices) and costly giving (positive prices) treatments, but excludes zero-cost giving. The step-shaped budget sets are not part of this data. 
Baseline: decision private, neutral cue, non-police recipient, positive prices include zero price giving 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
group, then the difference between “riot blame” and “neu-
tral blame” will be greater than between “riot no-blame” 
and “neutral no-blame,” in either the private or the public 
treatment. Although the direction of the effect is right 
(0.89–0.30 > 0.33–0.14 in the private treatment; –0.17– 
(-0.51) > 0.25–0.13 in the public treatment), it is not sig-
nificant. Similar results (not shown) were obtained for re-
gressions on individual giving decisions. Thus, the weak 
non-parametric results are not supported in a regression 
framework: we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
riot media treatment had no extra impact on individuals 
who blamed the police.
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Table 6: Linear regression of cheap discrimination and blame attributions 4.3. Participation in Demonstrations 
Laboratory behaviour can be accurately measured, but 
does it correlate with behaviour in the real world? To ad-
dress these concerns, our questionnaire included measures 
of participation in the December 2008 demonstrations. We 
examine how our “giving discrimination” measure cor-
relates with these self-reports.
Around 23 percent of our subjects participated in the de-
monstrations. Table 7 shows average donations by treat-
ments and groups. We see very clear and significant 
discrimination against police among subjects who par-
ticipated in the demonstrations, but only in the private 
treatment. The discrimination is stronger in the riot media 
treatment. In the public treatment, we do not see dis-
crimination. In contrast, the group of subjects who did not 
take part in the demonstrations do not appear to dis-
criminate against the police, except in the private, riot 
media treatment.
Base: Private neutral no-blame
Private neutral blame
Private riot no-blame
Private riot blame
Public neutral no-blame
Public neutral blame
Public riot no-blame
Public riot blame
0.14 (0.29)
0.30 (0.46)
0.33 (0.49)
0.89* (0.40)
0.13 (0.36)
-0.51 (0.39)
0.25 (0.45)
-0.17 (0.36)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results for downward sloping budget sets. A two-sided 
t-test rejects the hypothesis that in the private treatment the riot media has a different effect on 
subjects who blame the police and subjects who do not (p-value: 0.24).  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Participated in demonstrations
Non-police
Police
Δ
Did not participate in demonstrations
Non-police
Police
Δ
Neutral/Private
2.98
1.98
1.00* (0.053)
Neutral/Private
2.67
2.80
-0.13 (0.660)
Neutral/Public
3.34
3.85
-0.51 (0.240)
Neutral/Public
3.43
3.52
-0.08 (0.780)
Riot/Private
4.15
2.46
1.69*** (0.007)
Riot/Private
3.02
2.58
0.44* (0.100)
Riot/Public
2.12
1.69
0.434 (0.32)
Riot/Public
4.22
4.30
-0.08 (0.830)
Table 7: Average giving over budget sets with positive prices by treatment 
t-test for differences of giving between police and non-police groups. p-value in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Using the step-shaped budget set, we also examined 
whether subjects who chose the competitive point when 
the recipient was a police member were more likely to have 
been involved in the demonstrations. Estimating a linear 
probability model with participation in demonstrations on 
the left hand and the preference type on the right hand side 
of the equation, we find that those with competitive prefer-
ences were significantly more likely to have participated in 
the demonstrations (results available on request).
It could be that subjects misreported their participation in 
demonstrations so as to justify their behaviour in the ex-
periment. We cannot rule this out completely. However, as 
a robustness check we examined whether the answers on 
participation were different between the treatments. If self-
justification explained the answers, we would expect that 
the effect of the treatment on giving would be reflected in 
the answers. Fortunately, we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that the distribution of answers is equal (publicity 
treatments: χ²-test, p-value: 0.141, cueing treatments: 
χ²-test, p-value: 0.797). Therefore, although we cannot rule 
out some misreporting, we believe it is unlikely that the 
level of misreporting is correlated with in-lab behaviour.
We expected to find that subjects who participated in the 
demonstrations gave less to the police in the upward slop-
ing budget sets, but this was not the case. So, although self-
reported participation in the riots was linked to laboratory 
behaviour, we could not replicate the kind of behaviour 
that has material costs and risks, such as participation in 
political protest. Further work with a more selected group 
of subjects – for example violent protesters – might address 
this issue. Also, we cannot say whether causality runs from 
protest involvement to less giving, or vice versa, only that 
the two behaviours were correlated.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Many case studies of conflict propose that outgroup hatred 
can be whipped up by media and elite rhetoric. In our ex-
periment, subjects exposed to an “inflammatory” news-
paper article gave significantly less to police than to others 
in a dictator game, but only when decisions were private. 
Hypothesis 1, that exposure to the media would increase 
discrimination, therefore received qualified support. One 
explanation for the effect of media on people’s opinions 
and actions is the “spiral of silence” hypothesis: subjects 
care about other people’s opinions in forming their own, 
and they will infer these opinions from the media. However, 
in this case, the hypothesis that this will be strongly visible 
in the public treatment was not supported (Hypothesis 2). 
In fact, exposure to the media had less effect when decisions 
were made public. There was also no evidence that the 
media treatment increased subjects’ expressed blame for the 
police (Hypothesis 3). Why did the spiral of silence not arise 
here? In this case, subjects may have already known that the 
December 2008 events were a widely discussed and con-
tentious topic. If so, media exposure would have had little 
effect on their expectations of what others thought, and 
thus little effect on their public behaviour. 
Similarly, according to frame alignment theory, messages 
which are aligned with subjects’ existing beliefs should 
have more effect on their behaviour. However, when we 
examined the behaviour of subjects who blamed the police, 
we found no evidence that they gave less to the police (Hy-
pothesis 4), and only weak evidence that their giving was 
more affected by the riot media in the private treatment 
(Hypothesis 5). Frame alignment seems not to have oper-
ated here.
This leaves open the question of exactly why media ex-
posure did affect our subjects’ private behaviour towards 
others, even without affecting their expressed opinions or 
public behaviour. While we cannot answer this question for 
certain, one possible hypothesis is that in our experiment 
the riot article’s frame provided subjects with an internal 
justification for selfish behaviour towards the police, with-
out changing their expressed attitudes. An analogy can be 
drawn with research on self-serving choice of norms ( Loe-
wenstein et al. 1993, Konow 2000): when multiple norms 
seem to be applicable to a situation, subjects may choose 
the norm which benefits them most. Here, the riot article 
may have allowed subjects to apply a “Lockean claim” or 
“punishment” norm, justifying lower generosity to police. 
If this were so, it would be a previously unstudied pathway 
by which media reports might affect behaviour in conflict 
situations. For this reason, we believe that existing work 
examining media effects on opinions ought to be com-
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plemented by further experimental research into media ef-
fects on political and social behaviour. Future work could 
test our hypothesis on self-serving norms; experiments 
could also examine the effects of exposure to media over a 
longer period than the relatively short timeframe used 
here.
Laboratory experiments will always face questions of ex-
ternal validity. While we have no panacea for these con-
cerns, we were able to link behaviour in the experiment to 
self-reported participation in demonstrations. It is possible 
that subjects lied or misremembered their own actions, but 
we prefer the simple explanation that there was a genuine 
correlation with real-world behaviour, especially as re-
ported participation levels did not vary between treat-
ments.
Clearly, our laboratory results cannot explain the causes of 
the December 2008 riots in Greece. However, we can make 
inferences about discrimination and its triggers among 
Greek students. When given an appropriately chosen frame 
to understand recent events, many students gave less to the 
police. Students were reluctant to discriminate in the pub-
lic treatment, perhaps because they feared the disapproval 
of fellow participants whose political views were unknown. 
But in the private treatments, anti-police behaviour was 
elicited. These findings are still relevant two years later, as 
the events of December 2008 triggered general social un-
rest and further violence in the form of new terrorist or-
ganizations. In fact, the media themselves have become 
targets, with the murder of a journalist in July 2010; ex-
tremist groups see the media as part of the establishment 
that causes the general misery of the country (see dis-
cussions in Karakousis 2010 and Strittmatter 2010).
Based on our results we can also draw some general con-
clusions on conflicts between opposing groups in demo-
cratic settings. Our results show the power of the media to 
shape behaviour. In particular, they suggest that, surpris-
ingly, media may affect behaviour more in private than in 
public. This is interesting, since many important political 
actions, such as democratic voting, occur in private.
More generally, we believe that experimental methods will 
become increasingly important in studying the motivations 
behind political protest, contentious politics, and civil con-
flict. Both field and laboratory experiments have a role. A 
key issue will be defining and finding the population of in-
terest. We also hope that our work will generate interest in 
linking experimental and case-study approaches to these 
issues. As our experiment shows, the insightful hypotheses 
provided by qualitative work can be tested experimentally.
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 325 – 344
Hugh-Jones, Katsanidou, and Riener: Intergroup Conflict and the Media 342
References
Alivizatos, N. 1990. The Difficulties of “Rationalization” in a Polarized Political 
System: The  Greek Chamber of Deputies. Parliaments and Democratic Con-
solidation in Southern  Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. Lon-
don and New York: Pinter.
Andreoni, J., and J. Miller. 2002. Giving According to Garp: An Experimental Test 
of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism. Econometrica 70 (2), 737–53. 
Andreoni, J., and R. Petrie. 2004. Public Goods Experiments Without Confiden-
tiality: A Glimpse into Fund-Raising. Journal of Public Economics 88 (7–8): 
1605–23.
Ball-Rokeach, S. J., and M. L. DeFleur. 1976. A Dependency Model of Mass-
Media Effects. Communication Research 3 (1): 3–21
Bar-Tal, D. 1990. Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization: Models of Con-
flict and Ethnocentrism. Journal of Social Issues 46 (1): 65–81. 
Bargh, J. A., and T. L. Chartrand. 2000. The Mind in the Middle: A Practical 
Guide to Priming and Automaticity Research. In Handbook of Research Me-
thods in Social and Personality Psychology, ed. Harry T. Reis and Charles M. 
Judd, 253–85. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bauerlein, M. 2001. Negrophobia: A Race Riot in Atlanta, 1906. San Francisco: En-
counter.
Benjamin, D. J., J. J.Choi, and A. J. Strickland. Forthcoming. Social Identity and 
Preferences. American Economic Review.
Bernhard, H., U. Fischbacher, and E. Fehr. 2006. Parochial Altruism in Humans. 
Nature 442 (7105): 912–15.
Brewer, M. B. 1999. The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup 
Hate? Journal of Social Issues 55 (3): 429.
Christofer, K. 2008. Athenian Democracy in Ruins. Guardian, December 8, 2008. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/08/greece.
Clogg, R. 2002. A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge University Press.
Cooper, A. H. 2002. Media Framing and Social Movement Mobilization: German 
Peace Protest against INF Missiles, the Gulf War, and NATO Peace Enforce-
ment in Bosnia. European Journal of Political Research 41 (1): 37–80. 
Dana, J., D. M. Cain, and R. M. Dawes. 2006. What You Don’t Know Won’t Hurt 
Me: Costly (but Quiet) Exit in Dictator Games. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 100 (2): 193–201.
Demertzis, N., and P. Kafetzis. 1996. Society and Politics: Perspectives of the Third 
Greek Republic, 1974–1994. Athens: Themelio. Chapter “Political Cynicism, 
Political Alienation, and Mass Media: The Case of the Third Greek Repub-
lic.”
Featherstone, K. 2009. Street Protests in “Une Société Bloquée.”In The Return of 
Street Politics? Essays on the December Riots in Greece, ed. S. Economides and 
V. Monastiriotis, 1–4. Hellenic Observatory, LSE.
Fisman, R., S. Kariv, and D. Markovits. 2007. Individual Preferences for Giving. 
American Economic Review 97 (5): 1858–76.
Forsythe, R., J. L. Horowitz, N. E. Savin, and M. Sefton. 1994. Fairness in Simple 
Bargaining Experiments. Games and Economic Behavior 6 (3): 347–69.
Gamson, W. A. 1992. Talking Politics. Cambridge University Press.
Geen, R. G., and S. L. Thomas. 1986. The Immediate Effects of Media Violence 
on Behavior. Journal of Social Issues 42 (3): 7–27.
Glynn, C. J., A. F. Hayes, and J. Shanahan. 1997. Perceived Support for One’s 
Opinions and Willingness to Speak Out: A Meta-Analysis of Survey Studies 
on the “Spiral of Silence.” Public Opinion Quarterly 61 (3): 452–63.
Goerg, S., W. Guth, G. Walkowitz, and T. Weiland. 2008. Distributive Fairness in 
an Intercultural Ultimatum Game, Jena Economic Research Paper 2008–028. 
Jena: Friedrich Schiller University, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
Gourevitch, P. 1999. We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with 
Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. New York: Picador.
Habyarimana, J., M. Humphreys, D. N. Posner, and J. Weinstein. 2007. Why Does 
Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? An Experimental Ap-
proach. American Political Science Review 101 (4): 709–25.
Hallin, D. C., and S. Papathanassopoulos. 2002. Political Clientelism and the 
Media: Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective. 
Media, Culture and Society 24 (2): 175.
Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, and V. Smith. 1996. Social Distance and Other-Regard-
ing Behavior in Dictator Games. American Economic Review 86:653–60.
Ignatieff, M. 1998. The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. 
New York: Owl.
Karakousis, A. 2010. Archegoni tromocratia. To Vima, 20 June 2010.
Karamichas, J. 2009. The December 2008 Riots in Greece. Social Movement 
Studies 3 (8): 289–93.
Kassimeris, G. 2001. Europe’s Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 
17 November. New York: C. Hurst.
Kaufman, S. J. 2001. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
Konow , James. 2000. Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in 
Allocation Decisions. American Economic Review 90 (4): 1072–91 .
Loewenstein, G., S. Issacharoff, C. Camerer, and L. Babcock. 1993. Self-Serving 
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining. The Journal of Legal Studies 
22 (1): 135–59
Mamdani, M. 2002. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Michael-Matsas, S. 2010. The Greek Revolt, the World Crisis and Freedom of Ex-
pression. Critique 38 (1): 51–59.
Mouzelis, N. P. 1978. Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment. New York: 
Holmes and Meier.
Mummendey, A., B. Simon, C. Dietze, and M. Grünert. 1992. Categorization Is 
Not Enough: Intergroup Discrimination in Negative Outcome Allocation. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 28 (2): 125–44.
Neumann, E. N. 1974. The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion. Journal 
of Communication 24 (2): 43–51.
Oberschall, A. 2000. The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to 
Violence and War in Yugoslavia. Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (6): 982–1001.
Oberschall, A. 2001. From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugosla-
via. In Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions, 
ed. D. Chirot and M. E. P. Seligman, 119–50. Washington, DC: American Psy-
chological Association.
Pappas, T. 1999. Making Party Democracy in Greece. Basingstoke: Macmillan/Pal-
grave.
Patrona, M. 2006. Conversationalization and Media Empowerment in Greek 
Television Discussion Programs. Discourse Society 17 (1): 5–27.
Pridham, G. 1990. Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: Democratic Con-
solidation in Southern Europe. West European Politics 13 (4): 103–17.
Reinstein, D., and G. Riener. Forthcoming. Reputation and Influence in Chari-
table Giving. Theory and Decision.
Samatas, M. 1986. Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek 
Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the US Truman-Mccarthy 
Era. Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 13 (3–4): 5–75.
Scheufele, D. A., and P. Moy. 2000. Twenty-Five Years of The Spiral of Silence: A 
Conceptual Review and Empirical Outlook. International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research 12 (1): 3.
Scheufele, D. A., and D. Tewksbury. 2007. Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: 
The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models. Journal of Communication 57 
(1): 9.
Smith, H. 2008. Greece Shut Down by Strike amid Renewed Clashes. Guardian, 
December 10, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/10/greece-
riots-protests.
Snow, D. A., and R. D. Benford. 1988. Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Partici-
pant Mobilization. International Social Movement Research 1 (1): 197–217.
Snow, D. A., E. B. Rochford, S. K. Worden, and R. D. Benford. 1986. Frame Align-
ment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. American 
Sociological Review 51 (4): 464–81.
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 325 – 344
Hugh-Jones, Katsanidou, and Riener: Intergroup Conflict and the Media 343
Strittmatter, K. 2010. Kontrolleur und Komplize. Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 23 July 
2010. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/medien/griechenlands-medien-kontrol
leur-und-komplize-1.979035.
Tajfel, H. 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
USA Today. 2008. More Riots in Greece over Fatal Police Shooting of Teen. De-
cember 7, 2008.
Vallone, R. P., L. Ross, and M. R. Lepper. 1985. The Hostile Media Phenomenon: 
Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut 
Massacre. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49 (3): 577–85.
Veremis, T. 1997. The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy. 
Black Rose.
Walgrave, S., and J. Manssens. 2000. The Making of the White March: The Mass 
Media as a Mobilizing Alternative to Movement Organizations. Mobilization: 
An International Quarterly 5 (2): 217–39.
Weaver, D. H. 2007. Thoughts on Agenda Setting, Framing, and Priming. Journal 
of Communication 57 (1): 142–47.
Whitt, S., and R. K. Wilson. 2007. The Dictator Game: Fairness and Ethnicity in 
Postwar Bosnia. American Journal of Political Science 51 (3): 655–68.
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 325 – 344
Hugh-Jones, Katsanidou, and Riener: Intergroup Conflict and the Media 344
Appendix: The Newspaper Articles
1. Neutral
Skype Comes to Your iPhone
Internet telephony provider “Skype” has announced plans 
to expand its services to mobile phones such as iPhone and 
Blackberry, scheduled for May.
Skype has been working for some time to make its services 
compatible with the most advanced mobile phones in the 
market. In an attempt to expand its current user base of 
400 million people, the company has been offering cheap 
and occasionally free calls. 
Skype manager, Scott Darslang, made no secret of his great 
expectations for the success of adaptation on the iPhone, 
which he said was a great piece of technology and very 
compatible with Skype services. “The most important re-
quest from our users is the transfer of our service on the 
iPhone, and this demand is constantly rising”, commented 
Darslang in a recent interview.
Even though Skype is best known for its videocall service, 
the company yet to announce whether this function will be 
available on the iPhone. “We are very careful when it comes 
to quality,” explained Darslang, pointing out that they 
must first make sure that it works perfectly, before incor-
porating it in the iPhone package. 
From Kathimerini, March 30, 2009 (http://port-
al.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_kath-
world_1_30/03/2009_273107) 
2. Riot
The Constitution and the Blood 
December 2008. Exarchia. A special police agent, called 
“Rambo” by his colleagues, kills the high school student 
Alexandros Grigoropoulos; the bullet hits the fifteen-year-
old in the chest. The numerous protest voices on television, 
the internet gave the police to get away with the line of 
“police self-defence” and “emotional turbulence.” Eyewit-
nesses confirm that the policeman shot the boy in cold 
blood following a trivial verbal exchange, and departed im-
mediately with his colleague leaving the boy to die. 
Shocked by their brother’s murder, students across the 
country protested in anger. Fully aware and bitter that their 
voice will not be heard they left books (Ancient Greek, 
novels, maths, everything a child reads) and flowers on the 
“unknown soldier” monument in front of the Greek par-
liament. Among the books we might find a copy of our 
constitution with two points underlined: Article 2.1: “Re-
spect and protection of the value of the human being con-
stitute the primary obligations of the State” and Article 5.2 
“All persons living within the Greek territory shall enjoy 
full protection of their life, honour and liberty.” The stu-
dents have underlined “all persons.” With their blood. 
Extract from an article by Pantelis Boukalas in Kathimerini, 
December 9, 2008 (http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/
_w_articles_columns_2_09/12/2008_295314)
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